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Abstract 
As a newly emerging marketing mode, opaque selling has achieved great success in practice and attracted wide attention from 
academic. Most existing researches related to opaque selling are based on NYOP (Name your own price) or VOP (variable 
opaque product). In recent years, the NYOP modes opened by service integrators have been fully discussed. With VOP becoming 
increasingly important for service providers, related investigations are badly needed. In order to promote and guide the 
application of VOP, key issues such as pricing, opacity determining and positioning are investigated based on Blind booking 
service of Germanwings. The results specify the basic principles for setting price function and the compute logic for determining 
opacity scope. By analyzing the relation between customer utility and risk preference factor, the VOP positioning problem is 
settled from the aspect of customers' channel selecting. The analytical outcome also verifies the effectiveness of opaque selling in 
market segmentation. Finally, a numeric example is taken to explain how the results of this paper can be used in practice. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of KES International. 
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1. Introduction 
The development of information technology provides technical means for meticulous price discrimination on the 
management level. At the same time, the wide application of Internet promotes the innovation of marketing. 
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Combining both information technology and the Internet, electronic commerce has brought about possibilities for 
enterprise to innovate in product design, product positioning, product pricing etc1. In recent years, as an innovation 
pattern in electronic commerce, opaque selling thrives and draws wide attentions from both academic and industry. 
Opaque selling takes opaque products as the target of the trade and is characterized by network dependent and price 
differentiation. Namely, opaque products refer to the product with one or more properties invisible to customers 
before payment 2, 3. In some research work, probabilistic products are viewed as opaque products2. The essence of 
opaque selling is the information asymmetry of the product. This kind of information asymmetry helps to achieve 
PARETO improvement between channel members4, however, in some situations, it might be unfair to those who 
buy the product 5. 
Through opaque selling, enterprises provide discount price to price sensitive customers with additional 
uncertainty and high price to brand loyal customers on normal channel6. The co-existence of low price opaque 
selling channel and normal high price channel without cannibalization7 enables the wide application of opaque 
selling, especially in service industry. For example, only the rank and district of the hotel is visible to customers on 
Hotwire, the name of the hotel is hidden before payment. The information about the airline companies and flights 
are concealed before payment when booking tickets on Priceline. The destination is a mystery before payment when 
booking on Germanwings using Blind booking. Although the services are different in forms, the opaqueness and 
success in practice are similar, which has implicated the great potential of opaque selling. 
Germanwings is owned by Lufthansa airline. Her business covers Cologne, Düsseldorf, Hanover, Hamburg, 
Stuttgart, Berlin and other European city. On Germanwings, you can travel around big cities in Europe within 
several hundred Yuan. The low price makes Germanwings famous among the low-cost airlines. Blind booking 
service is one of Germanwings' most important and successful business modes. As advertised, the most surprising 
feature of blind booking products is the customers can not specify the travel destination before payment. The main 
process using the blind booking service is as follows (see www.germanwings.com for details): 
 (1) Customers select a departure from Cologne, Düsseldorf, Hanover, Hamburg, Stuttgart and Berlin, as listed; 
most of the departures are in Europe. 
 (2) Customers specify the basic theme of the destination (including: Sunny Beach, friendly, parties, cultural, 
shopping, urban, nature and adventure), the sunny beach theme takes 49.99 euro, other themes cost 33 euro, each of 
theme includes several destinations. The final destination for the customers may be any one of the alternative 
destinations. Customers can reduce the uncertainty of the product through additional payment (5 euros for excluding 
every one destination), but Germanwings requires more than 3 destinations. 
 (3) Customers confirm the round-trip time and other customer information (pregnant women, children and 
adults), package information (number, weight). 
 (4) Customers complete the payment and receive destination information. Considering the particularity of the 
booking process, Germanwings does not support refund or change for blind booking tickets. 
According to the procedure of Blind booking, key issues such as price and opacity are given in advance.  As a 
successful and typical VOP business mode, there is no doubt about the feasibility of Blind booking.  However, the 
key issues in the procedure arise following questions: 
x Are there any better price functions than linear price function? (The price is a linear function on the number of 
destinations in blind booking.) 
x How to determine the range of opacity? (Germanwings requires more than 3 destinations.) 
x What kind of people will choose VOP? (Germanwings is a low-cost airline.) 
This article is motivated by the curiosity to answer these questions. By answering these questions, VOP can be 
scientifically designed and promoted in other industries. In essence, this article focuses on VOP designing (pricing 
and opacity design) and VOP positioning (customer selection). The results are of great significance in guiding VOP 
implementations. The structure of this article is organized as follows: Section 1 introduces the research backgrounds 
and motivation of this paper. Section 2 reviews related literatures. In section 3, after introducing the model variables, 
price function design and opacity design are discussed. In section 4, the conditions under which customer chooses 
opaque selling channel are analyzed. Section 5 illustrates how the results of this paper can be used in practice 
through a numeric example. 
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2. Literature review 
Considering the objects and logic, current researches related to opaque selling can be roughly divided into two 
categories: (1) pricing issues in opaque selling, which are dominated by NYOP (name your own price) and its 
extended models. (2) Optimizing opacity for variable opaque product, these literatures are referred to as researches 
on VOP (variable opaque product). 
2.1. Pricing issues in opaque selling 
In recent years, due to the successful application of NYOP in Priceline, NYOP has become a typical and well-
known opaque selling mode. Most researches on opaque selling concentrates on NYOP, involving pricing, bidding 
and effectiveness etc. 
(1) Pricing. Pricing issues in NYOP mainly concern deciding the threshold price, above which the retailer accept 
the bid. Terwiesch (2005) established a NYOP model with haggling mechanism to analyze how the threshold price 
should be optimized and how the interface with customer should be designed8. Shapiro (2009) compares post-price 
sale and NYOP sales through experiments, the results indicated that, the threshold price for NYOP should be set 
around the marginal cost; otherwise, there would be no significant improvement9. Anderson (2009) analyzes the key 
factors that influence the price for service providers to implement opaque selling on Priceline, including the loss of 
sales due to high price and the loss of total profit due to low price. Kimpton was taken as an example to illustrate the 
price optimization and inventory allocation scheme10.  Furthermore, a dynamic programming model for pricing is 
proposed, pricing strategies for service providers were put forward6. Hinz (2010) considers the information diffusion 
problems in NYOP mode, they finds that information diffusion would affect the income of the enterprise, and the 
optimization of threshold price (reservation price) could be used to deal with the information diffusion11, by 
comparing fixed reservation price and variable reservation price, they concluded that when the mechanism for 
deciding the reservation price is revealed, the number of transactions and corporate earnings are significantly 
increased 12. Johnson (2013) analyzes how external reference price influenced the revenue of the enterprise in "Pay-
what-you-want" mode, which is similar to NYOP in essence. The results showed that the introduction of suggested 
price was beneficial to the maximization of profits, especially in the case of suggested price close to the internal 
reference price13. Fay & Lee (2015) analyze how customer's prediction of threshold price influence the profit of 
retailer, the results suggest that the retailer should reveal the distribution of threshold price to the customers14. 
(2) Bidding patterns. Among the researches concerning bidding patterns, the most frequently discussed issue is 
whether repeat bidding should be allowed. Fay (2004) has established an operational model of NYOP to compare 
the influence of single bid and repeat bidding on the revenue of enterprises, the results shows that customer 
cognition will influence enterprise's revenue and leads to the forbidden of repeat bidding15. As a matter of fact, in 
order to protect the interests of the service provider, repeat bidding is not allowed in Priceline within 24 hours. 
Gupta & Abbas (2008) investigates the repeat bidding NYOP model under the condition of multi-products, the 
results show that, the introduction of multi-products helps to improve customer expectations, which makes up for 
loss of allowing repeat bidding 16. Cai (2009) compares two bids NYOP mode and  one-bid-only NYOP mode, the 
results show that, two bids NYOP mode has a better performance17. By means of statistical analysis, Fay & Laran 
(2009) investigates the influence of price changing frequency on customer bid, the results showed that when facing 
medium price changing frequency, customer will take non monotonic bidding. When facing very high or very low 
price changing frequency, the customer will not take non monotone bidding18. Scott (2009) establishes a model to 
analyze the motivation of retailers using NYOP; he points out that not allowing repeat bidding leads to less 
competition and more benefits19. Joo (2012) analyzes the optimal bidding pattern from the aspect of customer, the 
results shows that customer savings rate is closely related to the bargain times and the shape of the bid function, 
when repeat bidding is not allowed, customers should choose linear bid functions20.  
(3) Effectiveness analysis.  As to the effectiveness of NYOP mode, Hann (2003) compares the NYOP mode and 
other e-commerce mode; the study found that the channel friction cost in e-commerce is higher than that of NYOP 21. 
Shapiro (2011) points out the effective border of NYOP when confronting risk averse customers22. Chen & Yuan 
(2014) analyzes of the benefits and risks of purchasing opaque products and pointes out that opaque selling has a 
good application prospects in accommodation, tourism, corresponding suggestions are proposed23. Chen & Gal-Or 
(2014) establishes a two stages gaming model between service provider and retailer to contrast post-price sales and 
NYOP, the results show why the retailer prefers NYOP24. Considering that information disclosure will affect 
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customer's expectations towards product and service, and the expectation will affects their bidding decision25, Fay & 
Lee (2015) investigates on how customer's expectation affects the revenue of NYOP retailer, and concludes that, 
when customers learn more about the distribution of threshold price, the profits of retailers will be better improved14. 
2.2. Optimizing opacity for variable opaque product 
Besides the researches on the NYOP mode, other opaque selling researches have connections with VOP directly 
or indirectly. Such as Jiang (2007) analyzes the application conditions of opaque selling from the perspective of 
customer characteristics, he points out that customers heterogeneity influence the effectiveness of opaque selling. 
When facing high heterogeneity customers, the enterprise will have to provide complete information products and 
give up opaque selling26. Fay & Xie (2008) investigate on probability product and pointed out the benefits in 
reducing disadvantage caused by information asymmetric and profit loss caused by uncertainty27. Furthermore, Cai 
(2013) elaborated on the benefits of asymmetric equilibrium brought to channel members in probability selling4. 
Post (2010) proposes a heuristic method for VOP pricing, and conclude that VOP can bring about greater benefits to 
service provider compared to other opaque selling, 28.  Post & Spann (2012) introduces the blind booking service of 
Germanwings and its achievements in detail, which provide reference for the application of VOP in other 
industries29. Lee (2012) uses a multidimensional binary Logit model to predict the probability of customers selecting 
their destinations, they concludes that the destinations with same language or close to the departure in distance are 
more likely to be excluded30. Based on the decomposition of dynamic programming method, Jochen & Claudius 
(2013) analyzes how the ratio opaque product and its opacity influence the revenue of service provider1, which 
provides a clear logic for the optimization of VOP design. 
Besides above classified literatures, Huang, Tingliang(2014) believes that opaque selling may soften price 
competition and increase the industry profits as a result of consumer bounded rationality31. Through a game-
theoretical model, Voigt, Sebastian(2014) shows that NYOP can be a sustainable pricing mechanism even in the 
long run32. Fay, Scott (2015) shows how consumers' bidding costs and expectations about the threshold price impact 
a Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP) retailer33. Wu, Zhengping (2015) considers using opaque selling strategy in a 
firm with price discount to induce demand postponement34. 
 As far as present studies are concerned, opaque selling is used in Hotwire, Priceline and Germanwings. Different 
in service forms, they all achieved great success. However, the number of investigation on "NYOP" is much more 
than that of "blind booking". "NYOP" mode has been thoroughly studied from multi aspects while the research on 
VOP is insufficient. Considering that Hotwire and Priceline are service integrators and Germanwings is a service 
provider, on Hotwire and Priceline, the opacity of the product is fixed10 while Germanwings can provide products 
with different opacities through "blind booking"29. From this point of view, the service provider is more flexible in 
meeting various needs of customers which indicates that VOP has a great application prospect. 
Our work is similar to Post & Spann (2012) 29 in that we both have the same research object, that is VOP in 
Germanwings.  However, Post & Spann focuses on the procedure, achievements and transferability of existing VOP 
modes. We focus on the optimal design of VOP, including price, opacity and customer selection. As far as the 
literatures discussing VOP optimization are concerned, they focus on either price or opacity. In our work, price and 
opacity are interactive.  
3. VOP design model based on blind booking 
The variables used in this paper are listed as follows. 
Nomenclature 
x  Opacity of the product for customers 
( )f x  Density function of  x  
( )F x  Distribution function of x  
( )p x  Price function on opaque channel, abbreviated as p  
sp  Price on normal market 
K  Risk preference index 
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U  Customer utility function, abbreviate of ( , )U p x  
( )G p  Inverse function for first order partial derivative of ( )p x , abbreviated as G   
*x  Optimal opacity for opaque product 
Lx , Ux  lower bound and upper bound for product opacity 
_L RAxc  Lower opacity bound for RA customers, the subscript _ RA  is used to distinguish different customers, and 
other similar subscripts are used in the same way. 
 
3.1. Price function design 
In the Blind booking service of Germanwings, customers can choose the opacities of destination according to 
their own situation ((as mentioned before, 5 euros for each unwanted destination). That is to say, the price of the 
product is negatively related to the opacity of product. In other words, price is a function of opacity. For simplicity, 
we denote ( )p p x , where x  is the opacity of the product. For probability product, its opacity is related to the 
number of service provider35, when there exist N  service providers, the transparency of the product is 1
N
36. In this 
paper, the opacity of the product is defined as: 11x
N
  , where N  is the number of destination. Considering:(1) 
when opacity is very low( 0x o ), the price on opaque selling channel should approach the price on normal 
channel29, which is denote as sp ;(2) When opacity is very high( 1x o ), the price of opaque products approaches 0; 
(3) Price decreases with the opacity. Price function ( )p p x  shall satisfy:
0
lim ( ) sx p x po  , 1lim ( ) 0x p xo  ,
( ) 0p x
x
w 
w
. 
In other words, ( ) (0, )sp x p  and 
( ) 0p x
x
w 
w
. Considering that different customers require different opacities, 
assume x  is a random variable with density function ( )f x  and distribution function ( )F x . In order to guarantee the 
generality of the conclusions, we do not specify the distribution form (Norm, Uniform, Poisson and so on). Based on 
above assumptions, the revenue of service provider can be computed as follows: 
1
0
( ) ( )dp x f x xS  ³   (1) 
In order to analyze the optimal form of price function, we introduce lemma1 as follows: 
Lemma1: For any forms of density functions: ( )f x , if exists: 1 2( ) ( )p x p xd , 
then:
1 1
1 20 0
( ) ( )d ( ) ( )dp x f x x p x f x xd³ ³ . 
Proof: According to the properties of integration and the properties of density function, that is ( ) 0f x t  , 
Lemma1  is obvious. 
According to the practice of Germanwings, price is a linear function of product opacity (additional 5 euro for 
excluding one unwanted destination), that is ( ) 5sp x p xD  . where 33sp  ,D  is the coefficient between the 
number of destinations and opacity. From Lemma1, the key to optimizing the revenue of service provider is to find 
a price function 2 ( )p x , satisfies: 20lim ( ) sx p x po  , 21lim ( ) 0x p xo   and 
2 ( ) 0
p x
x
w

w
. For convenience, four types of 
function are selected and depicted, as shown in Fig. 1. 
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Fig.1 Different forms of price-opacity function 
From Fig.1 we can see, all the price functions helpful in improving the revenue of Germanwings, are convex on 
(0,1) , that is 
2
2
2
( )
0
p x
x
w

w
. With the price function approaching sp p  and 1x  , the revenue gets higher. 
Considering the operating feasibility in practice, in addition to 20lim ( ) sx p x po  , 21lim ( ) 0x p xo   and
2 ( ) 0
p x
x
w

w
, the 
price function should be convex (
2
2
2
( )
0
p x
x
w

w
)to avoid being the inferior solution. 
3.2. Opacity design 
 As a new marketing channel, opaque selling might attract customers from normal markets and influence its 
revenue. In order to settle the potential cannibalization, the most common logic is to limit opacity within a range and 
get brand loyal customers back to normal channel. For simple and intuitive, we assume customer decision is depend 
on and only depend on price and opacity. In this situation, the utility of the customer can be depicted as 
( , )U U p x . Considering that utility decreases with the increasing of price and opacity. ( , )U p x  
Satisfies: 0U
p
w 
w
, 0U
x
w 
w
. In order to distinguish different types of customers, we introduce risk preference factor 
K , which is defined as: 
U UK
p x
w w 
w w
.           (2) 
When 1K ! , the customer is more sensitive to price than to opacity, this kind of customer is risk seeking 
customer (denoted as RS); when 1K  , the customer is more sensitive to opacity than to price, this kind of 
customer is risk averse customer (denoted as RA); when 1K  , the customer has the same preference on price and 
opacity, they are risk neutral (denoted as RN). 
Considering the properties of price function and utility function, within the right neighborhood of 0x  , the 
differential form of utility function is: U UU p x
p x
w w'  '  '
w w
 . The differential form of price function 
is: pp x
x
w'  '
w
. From the two equations we get: 
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( 1)U p U p UU x K x
p x x x x
w w w w w'  u  '  u  u '
w w w w w
        (3) 
 On condition that ( )p x  is convex, within the right neighborhood of 0x  , ( )p x
x
w
w
 is very small compared to 1 . 
Note that ( , ) 0U p x
x
w 
w
. We get 0U'   within the right neighborhood of 0x  . With x  increasing, ( )p x
x
w
w
 
increases. Considering the continuality of the functions and the variation rules, we know that with the increasing 
of x , U  decreases at first and then increases. There exists *x , satisfies *( ) 0U x'  , that is
*
( ) 1
x x
p x
x K 
w  
w
, which 
makes * *[( ( ), )]U p x x  the lowest. Denote the inverse function for first order partial derivative of ( )p x  as ( )x G p , 
thus, * 1( )x G
K
  . 
When *(0, )x x , ( ) 0U x'  , customer utility U  decreases as x  increases. When *( ,1)x x , customer utility U  
increases with x . Note that  0p
x
w 
w
 and 
2
2
0p
x
w 
w
, we know: p
x
w
w
 increases with x , which indicates for any 
x , * *(0, ) ( ,1)| |x x x xU U '  ' . Based on the analysis, there exists 
*2Lx x , satisfies ( ,0) ( ( ), )s L LU p U p x x . When 
the opacity for product is smaller than Lx , the customer utility is smaller than ( ,0)sU p , which means customers 
would rather choose normal channel with high price than opaque selling channel sp  when opacity is below Lx . In 
other words, Lx  is the lower bound of opacity. Considering the approximate symmetry of ( ( ), )U p x x  around 
*x x  
and for the sake of simplifying computation complexity, we denote *2Lx xc   as the approximate lower bound of 
opacity. 
When *Lx x x! ! , ( ( ), )U p x x  increases with x  especially for those customers with high price sensitivity 1K ! . 
As for product provider, when the opacity is sufficiently large ( 1x o ), 0p o . The low price may not compensate 
for the marginal cost and it is not acceptable for product providers. Therefore, the opacity should not excess a 
certain upper bound (In fact, there is no product totally opaque in practice). Suppose the marginal cost of providing 
every unit of products is $c$, note that the price function ( )p x  is a decreasing function on $x$, the upper bound 
(denoted as Ux ) of opacity can be calculated by 
1( )Ux p c
 , where 1 ( )p x  is the inverse function of price function 
( )p x . 
In summary, in order to avoid cannibalization and guarantee the benefits of the product provider, the opacity of 
the opaque products should be confined in ( , )L Ux xc  . where Lx c  and Ux  can be computed using 
*2Lx xc   and 
1 ( )Ux p c
 . 
4. VOP Positioning From The Aspects Of Customers' Channel Selection  
 Considering the differences of customers, we use following two Propositions to depict how customers choose 
marketing channels. 
Proposition1: The customers with low risk preference factor ( K ) have higher lower-bound of acceptable 
opacity ( Lxc ). 
Proof: According to the price function ( )p x , we know ( ) 0p x
x
w 
w
,
2
2
( ) 0p x
x
w 
w
. Note that ( )x G p   is the 
inverse function for first order derivative of ( )p x , which has the same monotonic as the first order derivative of 
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( )p x , that is ( )x G p  is a decreasing function on p . Considering that * 12 2 ( )Lx x G K
c    , Combining with the 
properties of compound functions, Lxc  is decreasing on K . Proposition1 is proved. 
For risk seeking customers and risk averse customers, 1RS RAK K! ! . Combining with Proposition1, we get 
_ _L RA L RSx xc c! . The result indicates that RS customers are more likely to choose opaque selling, which is coincident 
with the reality. 
Proposition2: There exists a threshold LK  for K , when LK K  , the customers will not choose opaque 
selling channel. 
Proof: From Proposition1 we know that Lxc  increases as K  decreases, once Lxc  satisfies 
* 12 ( )L Ux x x p c
c  !  , 
the range of opacity for customer becomes empty, which means there is no proper opacity for the customer with 
1 ( )Lx p c
c ! . In other words, the threshold value LK  of K  is determined by 
112 ( ) ( )
L
G p c
K
  , under which the 
customers will abandon opaque selling channel. Proposition2 is proved. 
The two Propositions have explained the logic of customers when choosing channels, which provides theoretical 
reference for product positioning and customer targeting. 
For intuitive and simplicity, the relation between the variables are depicted in Fig. 2 as follows. 
 
Fig.2 Relation between the variables 
As shown in the Fig.2, the convex curve is price function ( )p x , the two concave curves are utility functions for 
RS and RA customers( 1RAK  , 1RSK ! ).
*
RSx  and 
*
RAx  are the opacities at which the utilities reach the lowest, 
* *
RS RAx x  . _L RSx  and _L RAx  are the lower bounds of opacities for RS and RA. _L RSxc  and _L RAxc  are the corresponding 
approximate lower bounds of opacities, satisfies: _ _L RS L RSx xc , _ _L RA L RAx xc . Ux  is the upper bound of opacity set 
by the product provider. 
5. Application Of The Results 
In order to illustrate how the results of this article are used in practice, we specify the functions as follows. 
Assuming the opacity x  of customers decision obeys (0,1)U , which means ( ) 1f x  .  Assume the risk preference 
index satisfies 2K   and 2c  . The basic price function is a power function, ( ) s sp x p p x
E  , satisfies 
2
2
( ) ( )0, 0p x p x
x x
w w 
w w
. Under these assumptions, we get: 
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1
1 ( ) ( )s s
s s
p c p c
p c
p p
EE
 
  ˈ
1
1( ) ( )
s
pG p
p
E
E
 

ˈ
1
11 1( ) ( )
s
G
K Kp
E
E
  Ǆ 
For 1E ! , the relation between profit and E  is shown in Fig.3 as follows: 
 
Fig. 3 relation between profit and E  
From the curve we can see, when the customers' choice on opacity is uniformly distributed, the power E  for 
power price function ( ) s sp x p p x
E   can be reasonably optimized, in our case, E  should be set between [3, 4] . 
For practical convenience, we set 3E  . 
when 3E  ,that is 3( ) 33 33p x x  , 
1
1 3
3
31( ) ( )
33
p c  , 
1
21 1( ) ( )
3 33
G
K K
  
u
Ǆ 
The lower bound and upper bound of opacity for opaque product are computed by: 
' * 12 2 ( ) 0.14
2L
x x G    ˈ 1 ( ) 0.979Ux p c  Ǆ 
Considering that 112 ( ) ( )
L
G p c
K
  , we get 0.042LK  . That is to say, when the price function is determined 
as 3( ) 33 33p x x  , the lowest bound of risk preference index for those whose choose opaque selling channel is 
0.042 . The customers with risk preference index higher than 0.042  will never participate in opaque selling. 
6.  Conclusions 
The analytical framework of this article is based on blind booking service of Germanwings. In order to answer 
the questions in the introduction, key issues on VOP such as price function design, opacity design and VOP 
positioning are investigated. Through the analysis on pricing, opacity setting and customers' channel selecting, we 
concluded that:  
(1) Price function should be convex to avoid being inferior solution, that is ( ) 0p x
x
w 
w
 and 
2
2
( ) 0p x
x
w 
w
. From this 
point of view, the revenue of Germanwings can be further improved by changing the form of price function. The 
final optimum form for the price function can be settled according to the numeric example. 
 (2) The opacity for VOP should be confined in a range ( , )L Ux xc , where Lxc  can be approximately computed using 
12 ( )Lx G K
c    and 1 ( )ux p c
 . This conclusion explains the logic why Germanwings set a minimum number for 
the destinations.  In fact, a maximum number for the destinations is also required according to our research. 
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(3) The customers' channel selection indicates that opaque selling can implement customer segmentation and 
avoid cannibalization (customers with LK K!  choose opaque selling and customer with LK K  do not), which is 
coincident with former studies. 
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